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Abstract 
In this study we examine the effect of the presence of irrelevant performance information on the rank 
order decisions made by supervisors in relative performance evaluation (RPE).  Specifically, we in-
vestigate the effect of two types of irrelevant performance information patterns in what has been 
termed an asymmetric dominated decoy and a viable decoy.  We also examine whether relative per-
formance information (RPI) size (evaluating 3 versus 9 subordinates at a time) can moderate the ad-
verse influence of irrelevant information. The empirical results from our experiment support that the 
asymmetrically dominated decoy information pattern (where an additional subordinate is included in 
the RPE whose performance is similar to and is dominated by one of the original subordinates – re-
ferred to as the target subordinate) can increase the rank ordering of the target subordinate. Contra-
ry to our expectation, we do not find that the viable decoy information pattern (where an additional 
subordinate is included in the RPE whose performance is partially dominating the target subordinate) 
has a significant influence on the rank ordering decisions of subordinates. Our results also provide 
support for an interaction between the decoy information and RPI size for the asymmetric dominated 
decoy such that the rank order effect is only present when the RPI size is small (evaluating 3 subordi-
nates in our case). Our study informs designers of accounting information systems in several ways. 
   
Keywords: irrelevant information, accounting information systems, relative performance evaluation 
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1 Introduction 
Performance evaluation decisions play a vital role in accounting information systems, and are im-
portant for a number of different purposes, including performance measurement, coordination, feed-
back and program evaluation (Cleveland, Murphy and Williams, 1989; Martinsons et al., 1999; Hu 
and Huang, 2006; Huang and Hu, 2007; Chen, 2010). Thus, the quality of performance evaluation 
decisions is essential for both organizations and employees. However, despite the sophistication of 
accounting information system, the human factor continues to play an important role and may lead to 
biases (Kim and Kankanhalli, 2009). We explore effects of irrelevant information in a performance 
evaluation setting to inform designers of accounting information systems on adequate set-ups of per-
formance evaluation systems. 
The effect of irrelevant information on decision making has been investigated in a variety of areas, 
such as psychology (Nisbett, Zukier and Lemley, 1981; Gaeth and Shanteau, 1984; Simon and Baker, 
1995; Lu and Proctor, 2001), education (Rice, 1975), decisions of juries (Sue, Smith and Caldwell, 
1973), auditing (Hackenbrack, 1992; Shelton, 1999) and accounting (Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Gar-
land, 1990; Duxbury, 2012; Fargher and Wang, 2014). However, potential adverse influences of irrel-
evant information in performance evaluation contexts are relatively unexplored.  
Imagine that there is a supervisor evaluating two original subordinates - subordinate A and subordi-
nate B. Subordinate A and B are evaluated on two performance measures - sales revenue per square 
meter and return on sale. The supervisor judges the performance of subordinate A to be better than 
that of subordinate B on sales revenue per square meter and subordinate B to be better than subordi-
nate A on return on sale. Thus, overall the supervisor has no preference for subordinate A over B or 
subordinate B over A. Now, imagine that there is another subordinate C, who is similar to subordinate 
B but shows overall slightly lower levels of performance than subordinate B. Since the performance 
levels of subordinate A and B do not change, the performance of subordinate C should be irrelevant 
for the relative comparison of subordinates A and B. However, by adding the performance of subordi-
nate C to the evaluation, the supervisor’s preference between A and B has changed. Now, supervisor 
judges the performance of subordinate B to be overall better than the performance of subordinate A.  
Since performance evaluation plays a vital role in feedback, effort-stimulation, remuneration and ca-
reer development, it is important to investigate whether such a situation can occur. If such a situation 
occurs, it would reduce the quality of performance evaluation decisions and bring negative conse-
quences to both organizations and employees. Thus, it is also essential to investigate whether we can 
design accounting information systems in a way that such a situation does not occur. 
When a supervisor subjectively evaluates performance of several subordinates, one option is to rank 
them based on their relative performance information (RPI). Frederickson (1992) calls this process 
relative performance evaluation (RPE). Prior research has shown that supervisors’ behaviours in RPE 
can be affected by several factors (e.g. Bol, Kramer, Maas and Richtermeyer, 2015). We examine 
whether supervisors’ behaviour in ranking of subordinates decisions is influenced by particular infor-
mation patterns that include irrelevant information (such as information about subordinate C in the 
example above).  
We examine whether one type of irrelevant information, the decoy, can reduce the performance eval-
uation decision quality. We focus on two types of decoy – the asymmetrically dominated decoy and 
the viable decoy. The asymmetrically dominated decoy is the alternative which is similar to and dom-
inated by one but not all original alternatives (Huber, Payne and Puto, 1982; Herne, 1997; Simonson, 
1989). In contrast, the viable decoy subordinate is partially dominating the target subordinate but is 
still viewed as an inferior to the target alternative (Hartzler, 2012). 
Drawing on the example above, subordinate C can be seen as irrelevant information in the RPE con-
text because he or she should not have an effect on the rank ordering of the original subordinates 
(subordinates A and B). The dominance heuristic theory predicts that the decoy can increase the at-
Irrelevant Alternatives in Performance Evaluation 
 
 
 
Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 3 
 
 
tractiveness of an alternative which is most similar with it (Herne, 1997; Tenbrunsel and Diekmann, 
2002; Connolly, Reb and Kausel, 2013). The theory has been developed in the domain of customer 
choice. The question remains whether this theory also has explanatory power in the RPE domain. RPE 
involves managers who need to make relative comparisons among several subordinates. Such a rela-
tive ranking involves different cognitive processes. Huber, Payne and Puto (1982) suggest that chang-
ing the complexity of the decision task could change the decoy effect. Thus, our first research ques-
tion asks whether in RPE the rank ordering of subordinate is subject to a decoy effect.   
Our second research question explores whether more relative information decreases a possible decoy 
effect. Steele (2011) demonstrates that decision makers who can integrate more relevant information 
into a decision make better decisions (see also Bol, 2011).  
We designed a 3 × 2 experimental design to investigate the questions. The first factor was information 
pattern with three conditions: control condition, the asymmetrically dominated decoy condition, and 
the viable decoy condition. The second factor was RPI size with two conditions: small RPI size condi-
tion and large RPI size condition. 175 business students took part. They were expected to take the role 
of a regional manager of a chain store and their task was to give a rank to all store managers based on 
their provided RPI (Bol, Kramer, Maas and Richtermeyer, 2013).  
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. There is evidence in the literature showing 
that performance evaluation can be biased (e.g. Murphy and Cleveland, 1995; Tan and Jamal, 2001; 
Bol and Smith, 2011; Bol, Kramer, Maas and Richtermeyer, 2013). However, little is known about 
how irrelevant information influences supervisors’ performance evaluation assessments in RPE. Our 
study contributes to the RPE literature by showing that irrelevant information, such as the decoy, can 
influence rank ordering decisions. It is important for managers and designers of accounting infor-
mation systems to be aware of unwanted influence factors.  Biases in performance evaluation can 
have adverse effects to both firms and subordinates. If performance evaluations are biased, selecting 
the right subordinate for the right job can become difficult (Moers, 2005), additional costs from higher 
turnover and lost human capital may occur (Prendergast, 1993), and motivation and effort can be lost 
(Sims, Gioia and Longenecker, 1987; Moers, 2005). Due to these negative effects, special attention 
should be given to how to improve the accuracy of performance evaluations, such as reducing poten-
tial decoy effects in RPE. This may inform designers of accounting information systems to set-up per-
formance evaluation systems appropriately. 
Further, our study contributes to the literature on accounting information systems by examining the 
potential benefits of enlarging relevant information size. Since enlarging information size increases 
information gathering costs, it is essential to determine in which situations additional information is 
justified. 
2 Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Relative performance evaluation and irrelevant alternatives 
Performance evaluation is an integral part of performance measurement systems (PMSs) such as bal-
anced scorecards (Premkumar and King, 1994; Kaplan and Norton, 2001; Hu and Huang, 2006; 
Huang and Hu, 2007). Performance evaluation can be conducted in a relative fashion. In organiza-
tional settings it is normally the case that supervisors manage more than one subordinate (Bandiera, 
Prat, Sadun and Wulf, 2014). When a supervisor tends to compare performance across several subor-
dinates, one option is to rank them based on their RPI. Frederickson (1992) calls this process relative 
performance evaluation (RPE). RPE is frequently used in many activities. For example, students are 
ranked by their relative academic performance at schools. In financial markets, mutual funds attract 
investors based on their relative performance (Genakos and Pagliero, 2012). In sport tournaments, 
sportsmen are ranked by performance relative to their competitors. Similarly, it is common for subor-
dinates in organizations to be evaluated and rewarded not simply by their own absolute performance, 
but rather for their performance measured relative to the performance of their peers (Gibbons and 
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Murphy, 1990). The issue of RPE has attracted considerable attention in recent years. Many scholars 
point out that RPE has some advantages compared with other performance evaluation methodologies.  
First, RPE could filter out common uncertainty from compensation contracts (e.g. Holmstrom, 1982; 
Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Chow and Haddad, 1991; Frederickson, 1992; Mahlendorf, Kleinschmit 
and Perego, 2014). Consistent with agency theory, common uncertainty is described as the uncertainty 
faced by all agents (Frederickson, 1992). The outcome of one agent’s action provides information 
about another agent’s state of uncertainty; therefore, other agents’ performance can be used to filter 
out the common uncertainty from an agent’s evaluation (Holmstrom, 1980; Chow and Haddad, 1991). 
For example, the CEO performance measured relative to other CEOs in the same industry can exclude 
the effect of some exogenous shocks, such as the global financial crisis (Albuquerque, 2009). Com-
pensations based on RPE without common uncertainty could improve risk sharing between agents and 
principals, and motivate agents to enhance their effort levels (Mahlendorf et al., 2014).  
Second, social comparison theory indicates that people have a drive to perceive similarities between 
themselves and their peer group (Festinger, 1954; Frederickson, 1992; Brown, Ferris, Heller and 
Keeping, 2007; Hannan, Krishnan and Newman, 2008; Tafkov, 2013). Hannan, McPhee, Newman 
and Tafkov (2013) suggest that RPE could induce psychological incentives to subordinates. More 
specifically, subordinates feel pride if their performance is above that of their peers, and feel shame if 
their performance is below that of their peers, influencing effort levels. Therefore, RPE can encourage 
subordinates to compare themselves with others and can motivate higher learning, effort, and perfor-
mance.  
Prior accounting research focuses on how subordinates’ performance is affected by the use of RPI 
(Hannan et al. 2008; Hannan et al. 2013; Tafkov 2013; Newman and Tafkov 2014). However, a lim-
ited number of studies include the perspective of the supervisors. An exception is Hecht, Newman and 
Tafkov (2015) who investigate how managers use discretion over the provision of RPI. They find that 
managers with discretion over RPI are more likely to provide RPI to low-performing team-members 
than high-performing team-members to increase their effort. It further has been evidenced that super-
visors can be subject to biases and decision errors in the RPE process. For example, supervisors have 
a tendency to asymmetrically compress ratings when subjectively assessing performance by using RPI 
and this centrality bias can have negative organizational consequences (Bol, Kramer, Maas and Rich-
termeyer, 2013).  
We explore whether RPE is distorted when supervisors are subject to irrelevant information. Supervi-
sors usually receive a great deal of information in the RPE process (Nisbett, Zukier and Lemley, 
1981). Some decision makers are given information which is useful to make a decision. Other deci-
sion makers are given a mix of useful and useless information to make a decision. The information 
that is of “little or no value to a specific task or predicted future outcome” has been termed irrelevant 
information (Selby, 2011 p. 1).  
A prominent example of irrelevant information is sunk costs that are frequently incorporated into de-
cision processes (Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Garland, 1990). Sunk costs are believed to play an inte-
gral part in the irrational decisions to continue investing in projects that should have been abandoned 
on a rational economic basis (Keil et al. 2000; Duxbury 2012; Fukofuka, Fargher and Wang 2014). 
Furthermore, providing irrelevant information to decision makers can increase the likelihood of in-
formation overload (O’Reilly 1980), have adverse effects on decision quality (Sue, Smith and Cald-
well, 1973), dilute relevant information (Nisbett, Zukier and Lemley, 1981; Lu and Proctor, 2001), 
decrease processing efficiency (Simon and Baker 1995) and lead to less extreme decisions 
(Hackenbrack, 1992).  
Regarding RPE, when supervisors rank two subordinates (e.g. subordinate A and subordinate B in the 
introductory example), the RPI of another subordinate (subordinate C) can be seen as irrelevant in-
formation because he/she should not have an effect on rank ordering decisions among the original 
subordinates and should be of no value to make preference judgments between the original subordi-
nates (subordinate A and B). In consumer behaviour literature the widely observed effect in which a 
third alternative changes the preference between the first and second alternative has been termed de-
coy effect (Huber, Payne and Puto, 1982; Simonson, 1989; Shafir, Simonson and Tverkey, 1993; Si-
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monson, Carmon and O’Curry, 1994; Highhouse, 1996; Herne, 1997; Doyle, O’Connor, Reynolds 
and Bottomley, 1999; Hedgcock and Rao, 2009). The decoy effect is a violation of the principle of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives that “the preference ordering between two options should not 
be altered by the introduction of additional alternatives” (Shafir et al. 1993, p. 21).  
2.2 The decoy information pattern 
Hartzler (2012) summarizes three different types of the decoy alternatives: the asymmetrically domi-
nated decoy, the viable decoy, and the symmetrically dominated decoy. We focus on the asymmetri-
cally dominated decoy and viable decoy because the decoy effect is not evident when the decoy alter-
native is symmetrically dominated (Hartzler, 2012). The asymmetrically dominated decoy effect de-
scribes that introducing a new alternative, which is asymmetrically dominated by one but not all orig-
inal alterative, increases the attractiveness of the dominating alternative. Unlike the asymmetrically 
dominated decoy, the viable decoy partly dominates the original alternatives, but is still viewed as an 
inferior to at least one original alternative (Hartzler, 2012). 
A theoretic explanation for the decoy effect is the dominance heuristic theory (Huber, Payne and Puto, 
1982; Simonson 1989; Hartzler, 2012). According to this theory, when the decoy is used as the heuris-
tic, the dominating alternative will be more attractive either because the dominance is an indication of 
the superiority of the alternative or because decision makers perceive that it would be the easiest to 
justify choosing this alternative (Highhouse, 1996; Hartzler, 2012). Adding an asymmetrically domi-
nated decoy alternative may provide a simple reason for choosing the dominating alternative, thereby 
increasing the attractiveness of the dominating alternative and leading to less negative affect in deci-
sion making (Simonson 1989). Hedgcock and Rao (2009) provide neuroscience evidence. They find 
that the choice set with a decoy leads to less activation in the amygdale, which is a brain area associ-
ated with negative emotion. 
In the viable decoy people choose the intermediate alternative as a compromise (Herne 1997). An ex-
planation is that alternatives with extreme values are relatively less attractive than alternatives with 
intermediate values (Shafir, Simonson and Tversky, 1993). When the intermediate alternative be-
comes a compromise, it is the safest way for decision makers to justify their decision when they 
choose the intermediate alternative. 
Figure 1 illustrates the two types of decoy in a RPE context using the introductory example. The two 
performance measures - sales revenue per square meter and return on sales - are referred to as perfor-
mance measure X and performance measure Y in the examples. 
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Figure 1:  Illustration of two types of decoy 
 
In Figure 1, similarly to the introductory example, subordinate A and B are the two original subordi-
nates defined on two performance measures. Subordinate B shows a level of performance on perfor-
mance measure X of 120, which is higher than subordinate A (100). On performance measure Y sub-
ordinate B shows a level of performance of 60, which is lower than subordinate A (80). Thus, neither 
of the original subordinate dominates the other when summing up X and Y (180).  
Now, let us consider subordinate C1. C1 shows a level of performance of 110 on performance measure 
X, which is higher than that of subordinate A (100) but lower than that of subordinate B (120). C1’s 
performance on Y is 60, which is lower than that of subordinate A (80) but same as that of subordi-
nate B (60). In this case, subordinate B dominates subordinate C1 whereas subordinate A does not. 
Therefore, subordinate C1 in Figure 1 is called an asymmetrically dominated decoy. Following the 
dominance heuristic theory (Simonson 1989), due to the presence of the asymmetrically dominated 
decoy subordinate C1, supervisors perceive subordinate B more attractive than subordinate A.  
Considering subordinate C2 in Figure 1, C2’s performance on performance measure X is 121, which is 
higher than that of subordinate A (100) and that of subordinate B (120). C2’s performance on Y is 50, 
which is lower than subordinate A (80) and subordinate B (60). While the dominance relationships of 
C2 to both subordinates A and B is the same, C2 is more similar with respect to performance levels to 
subordinate B than to A. In this case, the subordinate C2 is called the viable decoy. Following the 
compromise heuristic (Herne 1997), due to the presence of the viable decoy subordinate C2, supervi-
sors perceive subordinate B more attractive than subordinate A. 
Generally, in RPE supervisors use peer subordinates’ performance as a heuristic to evaluate the target 
subordinate’s performance. We suggest that effects consistent with the dominance heuristic or com-
promise heuristic observed in consumer behaviour can occur in RPE. Considering our RPE example, 
the RPI of the decoy subordinates C1/2 can be seen as irrelevant alternatives because they should not 
change the rank ordering of subordinates A and B.  
Because the asymmetrically dominated decoy effect and the viable decoy effect are based on different 
relationships (dominance relationship vs. relative superiority relationship), we test them separately in 
two hypotheses:  
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H1a: The asymmetrically dominated decoy increases the rank ordering of the target subordinate in 
relative performance evaluation.  
H1b: The viable decoy increases the rank ordering of the target subordinate in relative performance 
evaluation.  
2.3 Information size and decision quality 
A large number of scholars attach importance to the role of information in accounting systems. For 
example, Shields (1983) points out that information choice is an important consideration in organiza-
tions, because information supplied by accountants could affect managers’ decision and subsequently 
organizations’ efficiency and effectiveness. Ashton (1974) documents another issue on the use of in-
formation in performance evaluation and control systems. He suggests that accountants, as designers 
of performance reports, must consider how much information to include in performance reports. The 
quantity of information in a performance report is referred to the information size. Often information 
inputs are quantitative and consequently information size is measured in terms of the number of quan-
titative items provided to managers (Iselin, 1988). 
The effect of information size on management decision quality has attracted considerable attention in 
the accounting literature (e.g. Shields, 1983; Iselin, 1988). However, the relationship between infor-
mation size and managers’ decision quality remains unclear. Some scholars find that larger infor-
mation size can enhance the quality of managers’ decisions (Barefield 1972; Abdel-Khalik 1973) oth-
ers do not find an association (Snowball 1980; Casey 1980) and others report a negative association 
between managers’ decision quality and accounting information size (Dickhaut 1973; Wright 1979).  
The relationship between the quantity of repeated accounting information and decision quality is 
commonly modelled to be an inverted U curve (Schroder, Driver and Streufert, 1967; Jacoby, Speller 
and Berning, 1974; Jacoby, Speller and Kohn, 1974; San Miguel, 1976; Shields, 1980; Iselin 1988; 
Chewning and Harrell, 1990). As the amount of information provided to the decision maker is in-
creased, the quality of decisions initially rises. However, beyond a certain point, a larger amount of 
information provided to a decision maker results in a decrease in decision quality. The decline in deci-
sion quality happens due to finite limits of the ability of humans to process information (Jacoby, 1977; 
Casey, 1980).  
However, many studies do not distinguish between the relevant information size and the irrelevant 
information size. Several studies in psychology indicate that adverse effects of irrelevant information 
on decision quality may diminish with increased relevant information size (Freeberg 1969; Nisbett, 
Zukier and Lemley 1981; Steele 20110. Bol (2011) argues that one reason of centrality and leniency 
biases in performance evaluation is the lack of complete relevant information on employee perfor-
mance. Consequently, more relevant information on employee performance for managers could in-
crease their performance evaluation quality.  
In this view, regarding RPE, more relevant information (RPI size of original subordinates) can in-
crease the accuracy of supervisors’ rank ordering decisions because it could reduce the salience of 
irrelevant information (the decoy) in RPE and it is less likely that the decoy is used as a heuristic. 
Thus, it is expected that increasing relevant information size can moderate the association between the 
presence of irrelevant information and decision quality. Hence, we expect that RPI size influences 
whether there is a decoy effect in the rank ordering of the subordinates. We formulate the second hy-
pothesis: 
H2: RPI size influences whether there is an association between the control condition and the decoy 
condition in the rank ordering of the subordinates:  
- when the RPI size is small the target subordinate is ranked higher in the decoy condition than 
in the control condition. 
- when the RPI size is large there is no association between the control condition and the decoy 
condition in the rank ordering of the subordinates. 
Irrelevant Alternatives in Performance Evaluation 
 
 
 
Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 8 
 
 
3 Research design  
Six conditions were designed based on a 3 (information pattern: control, asymmetrically dominated 
decoy, viable decoy) × 2 (RPI size: small, large) between-subjects experiment. All participants were 
randomly assigned to the six conditions. The task was to rank managers based on the information pro-
vided. Figure 2 displays the research model. 
 
 
Figure 2: Research model 
3.1 Participants 
186 business students took part in the experiment. The experiment was conducted in a behavioural 
laboratory of a large university. Each participant was seated in front of a computer to complete all 
experimental materials individually. The computers were separated via partition walls. On average, 
participants took approximately 10 minutes to complete the task.  
Ten participants were removed from the sample because they did not pass a test business case at the 
beginning of the instrument (as explained further below). One participant was excluded because 
he/she ranked the asymmetrically dominated decoy subordinate first. The final sample consisted of 
175 business students which comprised 119 undergraduate and 56 postgraduate students. The propor-
tion of undergraduate and graduate students across conditions is similar and not significantly different 
(Chi-square = 1.758, df = 5, p = .881). The mean age of the participants was 21.96 years and 40% of 
them were male. 96.6% were full-time students and 84% of them were doing a business major. Partic-
ipants had an average part-time working experience of 1.52 years and full-time working experience of 
0.59 years. There were no significant differences across six cells for age (F=0.551, p=0.783), gender 
(Wald=0.477, p=0.49), part-time working experience (F=0.681, p=0.638), and full-time working ex-
perience (F=0.915, p=0.472). 
3.2 Experimental task 
There were eight steps for participants to complete the instrument (see Appendix). In Step 1 partici-
pants were asked to read an introduction. In Step 2 an explanatory statement was presented. In Step 3, 
the business case information was provided. Participants took the role of a regional manager (hereaf-
ter, supervisor) of a chain store and received RPI about store managers they were supervising (hereaf-
ter, subordinates, when referring to this role). The task for the participants was to assess their subordi-
nates’ performance and give a rank ordering of all subordinates based on their provided RPI. The sce-
nario was constructed under the assumption that all stores were of similar size, sold the same products 
and were located in the same metropolitan area, hence faced similar economic and market conditions. 
Participants were also informed that although stores were relatively close, they did not directly com-
pete with each other. It was explained that all subordinates performed similarly, but were different in 
only two key performance indicators: sales revenue per square meter and return on sales (Bol, Kra-
mer, Maas and Richtermeyer, 2015). Participants were informed that sales revenue per square meter 
and return on sales were of equal importance (referred to as performance measure X and performance 
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measure Y for the task). In Step 4, an example business case was shown in order to teach participants 
how to rank managers based on RPI. Participants were informed that the top ranked store manager 
was the best store manager in terms of his or her performance. In Step 5, participants were required to 
complete a test business case in order to make sure they understood all the given information. They 
were asked to rank 3 managers based on their RPI by dragging and dropping managers on an interac-
tive screen. There was only one correct answer for the test business case. Participants who did not 
give the correct answer were excluded from the sample. In Step 4 and 5 managers were given names 
reflecting gender. In order to avoid a gender bias, we referred to the managers using letters in Step 6 
(see also Figure 3). Step 6 included the different treatments containing RPI on two performance eval-
uation measures for the store managers. The order of the store managers was counterbalanced in each 
treatment in order to control for the effect of subordinates’ order on the results. The position of the 
decoy subordinate was always at the bottom for all business cases. As shown in the Appendix Step 6, 
participants had to draw all managers to be ranked above a line. This should make sure that partici-
pants did not leave the ranking as presented to the participants in the first place. Participants were 
asked to rank all store managers using the RPI provided. Subordinates could not be ranked equally but 
had to be brought into an order. These ranks are used to test the hypotheses. After ranking store man-
agers, participants were asked to explain the rationale for their ranking decision on a following screen. 
Step 7 contained the manipulation questions. Step 8 demographic questions. 
3.3 Independent variables 
The first independent variable is the information pattern, which contains three conditions: (1) control 
condition, where the supervisor ranks original subordinates without the decoy subordinate; (2) the 
asymmetrically dominated decoy information pattern condition, where the supervisor ranks original 
subordinates and an additional asymmetrically dominated decoy subordinate; and (3) the viable decoy 
information pattern condition, where the supervisors ranks original subordinates and an additional 
viable decoy subordinate.  
The second independent variable is RPI size. The RPI size is manipulated at two levels: (1) small RPI 
size, where all participants are asked to rank two original subordinates and participants in asymmetri-
cally dominated decoy treatment and viable decoy treatment need to rank one additional decoy subor-
dinate; (2) large RPI size, where all participants are asked to rank nine original subordinates and par-
ticipants in asymmetrically dominated decoy treatment and viable decoy treatment need to rank one 
additional decoy subordinate as well. An example of the treatment asymmetrically dominated de-
coy/small RPI size is shown in Figure 3. 
3.4 Dependent variables 
We use two dependent variables to measure the ranking of the target subordinate. The target subordi-
nate is the subordinate who dominates the decoy subordinate in at least one performance evaluation 
measure, and is most similar with respect to performance levels to the (viable or asymmetrically dom-
inated) decoy subordinate (see Figure 1). 
The first dependent variable, RankTarget, denotes the position of the target subordinate in the rank 
ordering without the decoy subordinate. The decoy subordinate is excluded because this study aims to 
investigate the change of rank ordering of the original subordinates in RPE.  
The second dependent variable, RankTargetHalf, is derived from the RankTarget variable to enable 
comparisons between the small RPI size condition and large RPI size condition. It equals 1, when the 
ranking of the target subordinate is in the top half; it equals 2 when the ranking of the target subordi-
nate is in the bottom half. In the small RPI size condition both dependent variables are equal. In the 
large RPI size condition, the range of RankTarget is from 1 to 9, while RankTargetHalf equals 1 when 
the target subordinate is ranked 1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th, and equals 2 when the target subordinate is ranked 
5th, 6th, 7th or 8th.  
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Version A 
 
Version B  
 
Note: Version A and Version B were counterbalanced. In Version B 
Manager A and B are swapped in comparison to Version A. The original 
screen was interactive such that participants could drag and drop the 
managers for ranking purposes. 
Figure 3: Example of Treatment: Asymmetrically Dominated Decoy/Small RPI Size 
4 Results and discussion 
4.1 Manipulation checks 
After completing the experimental task participants answered a manipulation check question. The 
question asked how many store managers participants had ranked in the business case. Nine partici-
pants did not answer the manipulation question correctly (2 in Cell 1, 2 in Cell 2, 1 in Cell 3, 2 in Cell 
5 and 2 in Cell 6). We did not exclude these nine participants from the sample because participants 
had answered the test business case correctly which indicated that they understood all the given in-
formation and also understood how to rank subordinates. Results without the ten participants who 
failed the manipulation question are very similar and inferences do not change. 
4.2 Test of Main Effect   
Hypothesis 1a predicts that the presence of asymmetrically dominated decoy subordinate increases the 
rank ordering of the target subordinate in RPE. Panel A in Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. We 
can observe that from the 28 participants in the control group, 10 of them ranked the target subordi-
nate first (35.7% of the total in control condition) and 18 ranked the target subordinate second (64.3% 
of the total in control condition). From the 28 participants in the asymmetrically dominated decoy in-
formation pattern condition, 19 participants ranked the target subordinate first (67.9% of the total in 
the asymmetrically dominated decoy condition) and 9 of them ranked the target subordinate second 
(32.1% of the total in the asymmetrically dominated decoy condition). Panel B in Table 1 shows the 
results of the Chi-square statistic. The value of the Chi-square statistic is statistically significant (χ2 
=5.793, p < 0.05), confirming that the asymmetrically dominated decoy information pattern has a sig-
nificant influence on the rank ordering of the target subordinate in RPE. Thus, Hypothesis 1a is sup-
ported.  
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Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
                           Information Pattern: 
RankTarget:  
Control 
Asymmetrically 
dominated decoy Difference 
No. of participants who ranked 
the target subordinate first:  n=10 (35.7%) n=19 (67.9%) -9 
No. of participants who ranked 
the target subordinate second:  n=18 (64.3%) n=9 (32.1%) +9 
Total  n=28 (100%) n=28 (100%)  
Panel B: Chi-Square analysis (χ2) for H1a 
 χ2-Value Df p* 
Pearson Chi-Square  5.793 1 0.016 
Note: * Two-sided. RankTarget is the rank of the target subordinate in the rank ordering without the decoy subordi-
nate which ranges from 1 (better performance) to 2 (worse performance). n=number of participants. 
Table 1: Results H1a 
Hypothesis 1b predicts a viable decoy effect. Panel A in Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics. The 
percentages of participants who ranked the target subordinate first or second are relatively similar 
across the control and viable decoy information pattern. Consequently, the value of the Chi-square 
statistic is not significant (χ2 =0.113, p = 737, see Panel B in Table 2). Thus, Hypothesis 1b is not 
supported. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
                           Information Pattern: 
RankTarget:  Control Viable decoy Difference 
No. of participants who ranked 
the target subordinate first:  n=10 (35.7%) n=12 (40.0%) -2 
No. of participants who ranked 
the target subordinate second:  n=18 (64.3%) n=18 (60.0%) 0 
Total  n=28 (100%) n=30 (100%)  
Panel B: Chi-Square analysis (χ2) 
 χ2-Value Df p* 
Pearson Chi-Square  0.113 1 0.737 
Note: * Two-sided. RankTarget is the rank of the target subordinate in the rank ordering without the decoy subordi-
nate which ranges from 1 (better performance) to 2 (worse performance). n=number of participants. 
Table 2: Results H1b 
 
4.3 Test of Interaction Effect   
Table 3 Panel A and Table 4 Panel A show the descriptive statistics and Panels B the Chi-
square analyses for the large RPI size conditions. As expected in H2, there are no significant 
differences between the control and the decoy conditions for the large RPI size. This in com-
bination with the significant decoy effect in the small RPI size for the asymmetrically domi-
nated decoy pattern (H1a), supports that information size moderates the influence of the 
asymmetrically dominated decoy.  
Figure 4 Panel A graphically shows our predicted effect, that there is a decoy effect in small 
RPI size, but not in large RPI size. Panel B depicts the results for the asymmetrically domi-
nated decoy. Panel C depicts the results for the viable decoy. In Panel B we can observe that 
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the difference between Cell 1 and Cell 2 is larger in the small RPI size than in the large RPI 
size as predicted by H2. 
Planned contrasts using the weights [1,-1, 0, 0] and [0, 0, 1,-1] for Cells 1,2,3,4 as defined in 
Panel A/B of Figure 4 confirm that there is a significant decoy effect for the small RPI size 
(χ2 = 5.582, p = .017) but not for the large RPI size (χ2 = 1.656, p = .195) (Bonett et al. 1985). 
Thus, our interactive expectation in H2 holds for the asymmetrically dominated decoy.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
                           Information Pattern: 
RankTargetHalf:  
Control 
Asymmetrically 
dominated decoy Difference 
No. of participants who ranked 
the target subordinate first:  n=13 (46.4%) n=19 (63.3%) -6 
No. of participants who ranked 
the target subordinate second:  n=15 (53.6%) n=11 (36.7%) +4 
Total  n=28 (100%) n=30 (100%)  
Panel B: Chi-Square analysis (χ2) 
 χ2-Value Df p* 
Pearson Chi-Square  1.673 1 0.196 
Note: * Two-sided. RankTargetHalf refers to whether the target subordinate is ranked in the top (1) or bottom (2) 
half. The observations which ranked the target subordinate 5th are excluded from this consideration. A Chi-Square 
analysis based on RankTarget is also not significant p = 0.392. 
Table 3: Results H2 
 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
                           Information Pattern: 
RankTargetHalf:  Control Viable decoy Difference 
No. of participants who ranked 
the target subordinate first:  n=13 (46.4%) n=16 (57.1%) -3 
No. of participants who ranked 
the target subordinate second:  n=15 (53.6%) n=12 (42.6%) +3 
Total  n=28 (100%) n=28 (100%)  
Panel B: Chi-Square analysis (χ2) 
 χ2-Value Df p* 
Pearson Chi-Square  0.644 1 0.422 
Note: * Two-sided. RankTargetHalf refers to whether the target subordinate is ranked in the top (1) or bottom (2) 
half. The observations which ranked the target subordinate 5th are excluded from this consideration. A Chi-Square 
analysis based on RankTarget is also not significant p = 0.206. 
Table 4: Results H2 
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Panel A: Predicted (H2) 
 
Panel B: Assymetrically Dominated Decoy 
 
Panel C: Viable Decoy 
Figure 4: Percentage of participants who ranked the target subordinate in the top half across condi-
tions  
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5 Conclusions 
In this study we examine how certain information patterns can influence the rank ordering of subordi-
nates in RPE and how such influences on supervisors’ assessments can be mitigated. Under conditions 
of small RPI size, we find that the asymmetrically dominated decoy information pattern can change 
preferences for subordinates in RPE. However, we do not find a significant effect of the viable decoy 
information pattern on the rank ordering of subordinates in RPE.  
Further, we explore whether RPI size can mitigate decoy effects. When RPI size is large, our results 
indicate that both the asymmetrically dominated decoy information pattern and the viable decoy in-
formation pattern do not change the preferences for subordinates in RPE significantly. Therefore, in-
creasing the RPI size can reduce the decoy effect.  
The findings of this study have important implications for management accounting practice and de-
signers of accounting information systems. First, the study highlights the importance of irrelevant in-
formation in the design and use of accounting information systems. The results show that irrelevant 
information in RPE can directly influence the supervisors’ rank ordering decisions. Thus, irrelevant 
information does not only increase the cost of information gathering process (Langfield-Smith, 
Thorne, Smith and Hilton, 2015), but can also distort performance evaluations. Second, the study in-
dicates the importance of an adequate RPI size for performance evaluation decisions. The results indi-
cate that increasing the RPI size can moderate the influence of a decoy effect on supervisors’ perfor-
mance assessments. This implies that accounting information system designers could enlarge the sub-
ordinate supervision size in order to reduce negative effects of irrelevant information and increase the 
accuracy of performance assessments. However, the potential benefit of overcoming the negative ef-
fect observed stands in stark contrast of additional costs for the supervisor to evaluate more subordi-
nates and potential other information processing shortcomings. 
Our study is subject to limitations that may provide potential future research opportunities. Next to the 
usual limitations of laboratory experiments this study only examines the effect of RPI size on the ad-
verse influence of irrelevant alternatives in RPE. There are several other factors that can influence the 
effect of irrelevant information on supervisors’ performance assessment decisions. For example, 
Gaeth and Shanteau (1984) find that the adverse effect of irrelevant information on expert judgments 
can be reduced with training. Additionally, qualitative performance information or the number of per-
formance metrics used can change the nature of the effects observed. Hence, future studies could in-
vestigate whether training or other types of performance information can also reduce the negative ef-
fect of irrelevant information in performance evaluation contexts.  
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Appendix: Steps in Experiment 
Step Subject Content 
Step 1 Introduction  Welcome and information about what to expect and the flow of 
the experiment (e.g. what type of buttons to click to proceed). 
Step 2 Explanatory 
Statements 
Basic information about the experiment for ethics clearance (e.g. 
that participants can withdraw anytime) 
Step 3 Business Case 
Information 
Information about task, background information about chain 
stores, and information about performance evaluation measures 
Step 4 Example busi-
ness case 
 
Step 5 Test business 
case (interactive 
screen) 
 
Step 6 Business Case 
Information and 
Treatment (in-
teractive screen) 
Repetition of Business Case Information from Step 3 and ran-
dom assignment of treatments (3 x 2 between-subjects design). 
Step 7 Manipulation 
Check question 
Question on how many store managers participants ranked in the 
treatment. 
Step 8 Demographic 
Questions 
Questions on demographics (gender, age, major) 
